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Abstract Increasingly, large tech firms dominate eco-systems. 
From a societal perspective this is not always beneficial since 
these companies behave as value extractors; they charge an 
unreasonable high fee for their services and they can do so 
because they are monopolists. A possible solution to this 
substantial power concentration can be decentralized eco-
systems, e.g., enabled by blockchain technology, in which 
decision power is distributed fairly. However, this comes also 
with the requirement that such eco-systems need a decentralized 
governance model. This paper explores if such a governance 
model can be represented by conceptual models, in particular, 
e3value. We answer this question by designing a decentralized 
eco-system in the field of electricity supply, which enables peer 
to peer energy trading, and checking if important governance 
decisions, motivated by a systematic literature review, can be 
represented. 
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Nearly every company and individual is part of at least one eco-system. Based on 
(Moore, 1996), we define an ecosystem as a collection of parties who work 
cooperatively and competitively to satisfy customer needs. Well known examples of 
eco-systems are Uber, Google, and Facebook. All these eco-systems are dominated 
by only one player. 
 
Such eco-systems with a dominant player tend to do value extraction: Companies 
charge unreasonably high fees for providing services or goods, which is neither in 
the interest of, nor sustainable for society. To mitigate unfair value extraction, we 
propose the concept of decentralized eco-systems, which we define as a collection of 
parties who work cooperatively and competitively to satisfy customer needs, and in 
which decision power is fairly distributed over a (sub)set of parties in the eco-system. 
 
Such decentralized eco-systems, specifically in the field of intensive information 
services, can be realized with Distributed Ledger (DLT) and Blockchain (BCT) 
Technology. The most well-known case of BCT is the Bitcoin, in which banks  are 
disrupted by allowing customers and sellers to directly transact with each other, 
without a bank. In general, BCT enables decentralized business transactions between 
parties, without a powerful centralized party. However, governance of many BCT 
systems are poorly developed and is often an ad-hoc driven process. Bitcoin has 
some signs of a governance process, but the nodes play only a role at the very end 
of this process, namely by accepting or rejecting the revised Bitcoin protocol.  
 
To enable a decentralized eco-system, the key question is: How to govern and design 
a decentralized eco-system? In a traditional eco-system, the focal company is 
governed hierarchically by its board of directors and control, shareholders, and 
ultimately the government. In decentralized eco-systems, governance evolves to a 
negotiation game between participants, rather than a hierarchical top-down decision 
process.  
 
Based on our consultancy experience with decentralized business development 
projects we have seen that these projects usually do not have a sound governance 
system in place; in practice, the decentralized project is often driven and governed 
by one single enterprise, which is often also the technology provider. For 
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decentralized eco-systems, this is not in line with the philosophy that decision power 
should be equally and fairly distributed over parties in the eco-system. Even the 
strongest supporters of adopting a decentralized eco-system have conceded that the 
biggest challenge is the design of distributed governance (Zachariadis, 2019) and 
consider decentralized governance is an emerging research field (Alves, 2017). 
 
The specific research question in this paper is to what extent governance decisions 
can be represented by conceptual models, in particular, e3value. The goal of 
conceptual models is to precisely and unambiguously represent an artefact in reality 
with the aim for (automated) analysis. This is precisely our long-term research 
objective: We want to software-support the design and analysis of governance 
constructs, and we refer to this field as computational governance.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we briefly explain what we mean by 
BCT-enabled decentralized eco-systems, and we elaborate on the notion of 
‘governance’. Then we explain in Sec. 3 our research methodology, which is 
Exploratory Technical Action Research (ETAR). A crucial element in ETAR in the 
involvement in a real-life project, which in our case, is a project about decentralized 
enabled renewable energy trading (Sec. 4). Finally, Sec. 5 presents our conclusions. 
 
2 Governance of decentralized eco-systems 
 
To understand governance and its layers, we revise the generic control paradigm of 
Blumenthal (see e.g., (Bemelmans, 1994) and  (Leeuw, de, 1973)) to arrive at a more 
specific governance paradigm (see Fig. 1). We distinguish three governance systems: (1) 
the governed system (operations of a company) that has to obey to rules set by the 
governing system (e.g. the management of that same company), (2) the governing 
system that monitors and steers the governed system, and (3) the meta governing 
system that controls the governing system (e.g. the government of a country). 
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Figure 1: The governance paradigm 
 
The rules are normative, e.g., the governed system should comply with these rules. 
(Re)design of rules is based on the monitoring of the governed system. The governed 
system performs value-adding operations, such as providing a video stream to customers 
in return for money (in the case of e.g. Netflix). The meta-governance system 
prescribes the rules for making rules (by the governance system). This implies that 
the governance system is a governed system at the same time. It is important that 
we understand the system as in system’s theory: A system consists of entities with 
relationships. In our work (see also the next section), the governed system is a 
decentralized network of enterprises (e.g., a networked value constellation (Normann & 
Ramírez, 1993) or an eco-system (Moore, 1996)).  
 
3 Exploratory Technical Action Research 
 
We are interested in how to design governance for decentralized eco-systems and to 
what extent the governance of such eco-systems can be expressed in an e3value 
model. Often, ‘decentralized governance’ is considered ex-post, that is when 
governance is already in place and up for evaluation. In contrast, we study the topic 
ex-ante, e.g., as a topic of design, cf. (Erbguth & Morin, 2018). Concretely, we do so 
by means of a project about renewable energy that facilitates peer-to-peer energy 
trading. We have been actively involved in this project. We use Exploratory 
Technical Action Research (ETAR), following the TAR approach, which is often 
used in the field of Design Sciences (Wieringa, 2014). ETAR comprises the following 
activities: (1) problem analysis, (2) treatment design, (3) treatment, and (4) treatment 
analysis. The notion of ‘exploratory’ emphasizes that we use TAR to first understand 
decentralized governance better, which might be followed by one or more TAR 
engagements with the field with the goal of theory formation and evaluation of the 
validity of the theory.  
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4 Governance for peer-to-peer energy trading 
 
4.1 Project background 
 
We have been working on energy transition towards renewable energy project that 
facilitates peer-to-peer energy trading. In The Netherlands, private citizens who have 
photo-voltaic (PV) cells, currently may subtract the generated electricity from the 
consumed electricity and only pay for the net amount of consumed electricity. 
Effectively, the owner receives the electricity price for sold electricity that should be 
paid normally, if he buys electricity (in The Netherlands about 0,20 Euro/KWh). 
During day-time, when the sun shines, the owner may generate more electricity than 
he needs and sells the surplus to the net. At night, the opposite happens. 
Consequently, the electricity grid functions as a kind of store: if the PV cell owner 
has a surplus, it can be delivered to the grid, and if he has a shortage, he can obtain 
electricity from the net, and the owner pays only for the net energy bought measured 
over one year. 
 
This storage is offered free of charge, while for the large scale electricity suppliers 
and power generators who provice this service, it is not free at all. Due to physical 
constraints, the amount of electricity generated in a grid should at all times equal the 
amount of electricity consumed. The large electricity suppliers and generators are 
responsible for keeping this balance, and they do so by switching on and off 
generators and loads if demand and supply requires that. Obviously, this flexibility 
does not come for free, and therefore large electricity providers complain about the 
attractive arrangements for private owners of PV cells. 
 
As a result, the Dutch government has decided to depreciate the current 
arrangement gradually. In the new situation, owners of PV cells directly receive a fee 
if they deliver to the grid. This fee is expected to be substantially lower than the 0.20 
Euro/KWh mentioned earlier (e.g. 0.06 Euro/KWh). The same happens if 
electricity needs to be bought. It is not allowed anymore to settle generated and 
consumed electricity over the period of one year. 
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To mitigate the decrease in revenue for private owners of PV cells, we have designed 
an innovative, peer-to-peer business model for energy trading. If a private owner has 
a surplus of energy, he first sells it to another private owner. In case of shortage, 
owners buy electricity first from their peers. In case all participating owners have 
sufficient electricity, the surplus can be sold to the electricity market, as proposed by 
the government. In case of a shortage, owners buy electricity from the electricity 
market. 
 
4.2 Problem analysis 
 
The problem at hand is how to design governance in a decentralized eco-system. In 
Design Science, the notion of artefacts is key. We express artefacts in terms of 
conceptual models (Brodie, Mylopoulos, & Schmidt, 2012). These models allow for 
a better and shared understanding of the domain at hand and facilitates automated 
proof of correctness of models and computer-assisted analysis of the domain at hand 
(e.g., compliance with governance rules set by law). We want to understand whether 
model-based artefacts can assist in designing and understanding governance in 
decentralized eco-systems. 
 
4.3 Treatment design: Governance artefacts 
 
One of the first questions in terms of Design Science (Hevner et al., 2004) is what 
the actual design artefacts are. Without having the intention to be complete, based 
on our previous experience with eco-system design projects, and inspired on 
(Wieringa, Engelsman, Gordijn, & Ionita, 2019), we propose at least the following 
artefacts:  
 
• The strategy artefact: Identifies the participants (as governing parties), rule, 
regulation, and lawmakers (as governing parties), their capabilities, and the 
services and products offered and requested. It provides a high-level blueprint of 
the eco-system at hand. Such models can be expressed by e.g., the UML Business 
Motivation Model (BMM) (BMM 2015) or i* to represent the strategic intent of 
stakeholders (Yu, 1997).  
• The business model artefact: Puts into operation the strategy of the eco-
system, in terms of flows of valuable objects. It also addresses economic 
reciprocity. Such models can be represented by e.g., e3value (Gordijn & 
Fadime Kaya, Jaap Gordijn, Roel Wieringa and Marc Makkes: 
Exploring Governance in a Decentralized Energy Trading Eco-System 355 
 
 
Akkermans, 2018), the Resource Event Agent (REA) ontology (Geerts, 
Mccarthy, Andersen, Dunn, & Smith David, 1999), and the Value Delivery 
Modeling Language (VDML) (VDML 2018).  
• The business process & data artefacts: These artefacts represent the 
processes, time-ordering of activities, the performance of these by resources, and 
interaction between activities, in terms of message flows. Also expressed is a 
domain model of the relevant entities, relationships, and properties. There are 
many possibilities to represent these artefacts, we refer here to the Business 
Process and Model Notation (BPMN) (BPMN 2013) and the Unified Modelling 
Language (UML), more specifically class diagrams (Seidl, Scholz, Huemer, & 
Kappel, 2015).  
• The IT artefact: This artefact encloses a number of sub-artefacts, e.g., the 
relevant views of the UML (Seidl et al., 2015), such as class-, activity, state 
transition- and deployment models. The focus is on embodying the previous 
artefacts into IT components.  
 
These artefacts become governance artefacts as soon as they are prescriptive, 
meaning that they set the rules for the partipants. All these artefacts can play that 
role. 
 
Designing all artefacts is a significant amount of work that exceeds the reporting 
space in this paper. Therefore, we concentrate on the business model artefact. The 
strategy artefact was already known when we entered the project, namely cost 
reduction for PV cell owners as soon as the new energy regulation starts. The other 
artefacts follow once there is agreement about the business model. 
 
4.4 Treatment: A peer-to-peer energy business model expressing 
governance decisions 
 
The project consortium consists of an energy certification body, a research institute, 
and a BCT platform provider.  To express the business model, we require a language 
and we have chosen for the e3value methodology (Gordijn & Akkermans, 2018). This 
a tractable and teachable method for business development specifically designed for 
eco-systems. Note that the traditional energy infrastructure is hierarchically and 
centrally orchestrated, therefore it does not provide decentralized governance for 
the case at hand. Consequenty, a new governance model is needed. 
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In figure 2, we model the business model for the peer-to-peer energy trading 
ecosystem, expressed as an e3value model. The model is the outcome of several 
workshops with stakeholders but is simplified (some parties are left out) to allow for 
a compact presentation in this paper. Prosumers are market segments because there are 
many of them (e.g. households). Prosumers own PV cells and likely batteries (e.g., 
in their electric cars) to store electricity temporally. A market segment is a set of 
homegenous actors.  Actors are also economically independent parties, such as the 
Cooperation and the Electricity Trader. The Cooperation aggregates electricity 
power from Prosumers and can, therefore, negotiate a better deal with the Trader. 
In the same way, the Trader delivers electricity against favourable conditions to 
Prosumers via the Cooperation if there is not enough electricity generated by the 
Prosumers themselves. As can be seen from the model, the Prosumer uses first 




Figure 2: Peer-to-Peer Energy trading 
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Similarly, if the Trader generates more electricity than it requires, it first stores the 
energy in a battery component. If there is still a surplus of electricity, the Prosumer 
sells electricity to other Prosumers: the peers. The same happens if a Prosumer 
consumes more than it can obtain from its PC cells or batteries; then, it first obtains 
electricity from other Prosumers. To be attractive to all parties, the peer-to-peer 
electricity price should be higher than the price the Trader would pay while buying 
(so more than 0.06 Euro/KWh) but lower than the price the Trader charge while 
selling (so lower than 0.20 Euro/KWh). This gives sufficient price negotiations 
between Prosumers (peers). This represents the peer-to-peer trading. Furthermore, the 
Cooperation provides a service to the Prosumers, namely an IT-enabled energy 
trading platform. Part of the service is (dis)aggregation of electricity to the trader, to 
sell a surplus of electricity of the Prosumers, or to buy electricity for the Prosumers 
in case the Prosumer do no have sufficient electricity himself. This way, the 
Cooperation ensures that at all time the supply and demand of electricity are in 
balance, which is a requirement for the electricity grid. 
 
4.5 Treatment analysis: Governance decisions in the peer-to-peer 
business model 
 
In terms of treatment analysis, the question is whether a business model represents 
governance decisions adequately. In (Alves, 2017), a number of governance 
mechanisms have been identified based on a systematic literature review of 63 
studies on governance for eco-systems. The study of (Alves, 2017) focuses on eco-
systems with one dominant actor, which differs from a decentralized eco-system. 
However, we consider the study as an useful starting point because most of these 
mechanisms are also applicable to decentralized eco-systems. 
 
In (Alves, 2017), three classes of governance mechanisms are identified that can be 
used to design governance in eco-systems: (1) value creation, (2) coordination of 
players, and (3) organizational openness & control. Each class of governance 
mechanism has subclasses (see below). We use these governance mechanisms to 
evaluate per governance mechanisms to what extent our e3value model for peer-to-
peer energy trading (see Fig. 2) represents the governance decisions. 
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Value creation evalution based on our e3value model. 
 
The value creation aspect considers how value is created and distributed. 
 
• Revenue model. The revenue model shows how each actor earns money. In the 
e3value model, this is shown by means of value transfers. In the peer-to-peer 
energy trading case, a Prosumer pays a lower price for electricity than the fee a 
Trader would charge.  
• Attract and maintain partners. The electricity case has a close resemblance to the 
idea of partnering. Effectively, partners (the Prosumers) team up to provide each 
other electricity and act as one to the electricity market if there is a surplus of 
shortage in electricity. This partnership can not easily be observed in the e3value 
model, because in e3value, a partnership has a different meaning, namely two or 
more actors offering or requesting objects of value together as one proposition.  
• Stimulate co-investments and share costs. Each Prosumer has to invest in 
technology to participate in the eco-system. Although not visible in the graphical 
model, this can be represented to quantify the model, which is a standard feature 
of the e3value method. For shared-costs, all Prosumers contribute to the financial 
sustainability of the Cooperation. This can be seen from the value transfer "peer-
to-peer trading".  
 
Coordination of players evalution based on our e3value model. 
 
Parties in an eco-system should work together in a harmonized way. 
 
• Roles and responsibilities. A governance decision is to have a cooperation and 
not only Prosumers. A truly peer-to-peer system would not have a cooperation. 
However, the Cooperation represents all Prosumers, and these should have a say 
in the decision making processes of the cooperation. The e3value model does not 
represent this, e.g., does not model that a party is represented by some other 
party for decision making. This could be an extension of the e3value language (see 
e.g., (Sarkar & Gordijn, 2018) for a proposal on how to do this). Furthermore, 
value activities can represent the roles of actors. The model presents only value 
activities to distinguish between the consumption of electricity and the 
generation and storage of electricity. This is needed to represent that buyers first 
'buy' electricity from themselves before buying electricity from their peers or 
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Cooperation. Value activities could be added to the other actors to emphasize 
the roles they take.  
• Effective communication channels. The peer-to-peer electricity trading eco-
system is supported by information technology, more specifically BCT, to avoid 
the emergence of a central party. Communication is not represented by an e3value 
model; other artefacts must be developed to represent this.  
• Conflict management. In any eco-system, conflicts can arise, and in peer-to-peer 
eco-system there is no centralized party that can resolve conflicts. Conflict 
management is a topic by itself, it can be seen as a commercial service (then it 
would be visible in the e3value model), but also as an inter-organizational business 
process, and hence be modelled by a business process artefact.  
• Manage resources, risk, and expectations. Resources (e.g., a capacity to perform 
activities) can be seen by the value activities as assigned to actors. Risks and 
expectations can be analyzed by the e3value model by quantifying it and then 
performing what-if analyses.  
 
Organizational openness and control evalution based on our e3value model. 
 
Eco-systems can be open (or closed) to their environment, e.g., of actors that may 
participate. Control refers to the actor(s) who orchestrate the eco-system.  
 
•  Autonomy. In this case, autonomy would refer to the decision power of actors 
in their own right. In the case of normal electricity consumption, the consumer 
buys electricity from a large supplier and has no decision power . For the peer-
to-peer electricity case, decision power is with the cooperation. These processes 
can not be seen by the e3value model.  
• Distribution of power. The peer-to-peer electricity case distributes power equally 
over the Prosumers. This can be seen from the e3value model. Prosumers are 
depicted as the same kind of actor, and consequently, their need for electricity is 
the same, as it is for generating electricity. Since Prosumers are part of a market 
segment, they assign economic value to electricity in the same way. 
Quantification would illustrate that Prosumers earn and spend the same amount 
of money.  
• Architectural decisions. The eco-system at hand requires an IT architecture, to 
allow for interoperability between all parties. This is not illustrated by the e3value 
model. 
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The question raised at the beginning of the paper is to what extent an e3value model 
can present governance decisions. Concerning value creation, we have learned that 
e3value represents decisions regarding the revenue model. However, partnering of 
Prosumers can not really be represented in e3value, the notion of partnership needs 
to be revisited, e.g., by introducing different kinds of partnerships. Investments and 
cost-sharing can be represented if the model is quantified. Coordination of players 
seems to be more a business process design issue than a business (value) model 
concern. Roles and responsibilities can be partly represented by value activities; risk 
and expectations by running what-if scenarios, which is a standard functionality of 
the e3value toolset. An e3value model can partly visualize organizational openness and 
control. Autonomy regarding the decision process can not easily be seen; the 
distribution of power can be spotted in various ways. Architectural decisions require 
IT modeling techniques, but also a commitment to standards to ensure inter-
operability. As a final remark, although an e3value model can represent some aspects 
of governance decisions, the design process for e3value is focused on business 
development: understanding the required eco-system, performing a financial 
sustainability assessment and fraud analysis. The other layers of the eco-system 
should be designed and analysed as well (such as control, ICT and powergrid layer). 
For future research we plan to extend the peer-to-peer e3value model and to model 
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